

The Complexities of the English Simple Present

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The simple present tense in English has several interpretations, depending on the type of verb, other elements in the sentence, and the context in which the sentence appears. Some of these possibilities are shown in (1):

- (1) a. Judith has long hair. (ongoing state of affairs)
- b. Ruthie walks to school. (habitual)
- c. Charlotte teaches syntax next term. (timetable)
- d. The young boy enters the room. He looks around. He notices the book on the table ... (reportive)

Intuitively, it seems that the unmarked interpretation of the present tense ought to be that the event or state denoted by the verb is simultaneous, in some sense, with the moment of speech. However, only the stative sentence in (1a) has this reading. The sequence of sentences in (1d) describes a set of events taking place during the speech event, but this is felt by speakers to be a marked use of the present tense.

This paper proposes an analysis of the simple present tense in English which accounts for all of the data in (1), in which there is a single, monosemous present tense morpheme. The analysis is part of a larger theory of tense systems, an earlier version of which can be found in Cowper 1996a.

PREVIOUS TREATMENTS OF THE SIMPLE PRESENT

Kamp & Reyle 1993

Kamp & Reyle 1993 consider a sentence like (2) to be ungrammatical:

- (2) Mary reads a book.

They stipulate that the eventuality described by a present tense utterance must “properly include” the location time. In the case of a present tense utterance, the location time is the utterance time. In other words, present tense-marked sentences must extend over an interval of time including the moment of speech. This is in contrast to their stipulation about the simple past tense, where there are two possibilities. Either the eventuality may be properly included within the location time, as in (3), or the eventuality may properly include the location time, as in (4):

- (3) Mary read a book yesterday.

- (4) Mary was ill yesterday.

In (3), the entire event of reading the book is interpreted as taking place within the interval denoted by the adverb, while in (4) the illness is normally interpreted as extending over an interval of time longer than one day, and including the interval denoted by the adverb.

For Kamp & Reyle, then, the inclusion relation in past tense sentences depends on whether the sentence is an event or a state. But in the present tense sentences, by stipulation, the inclusion goes only one way, with the eventuality properly including the location time. A sentence like (2) is thus ruled out as follows. First, if an eventuality properly includes its location time, that eventuality is a state, not an event. This is their definition of a state. Second, with the present tense, the eventuality properly includes the location time (by stipulation). Therefore, the present tense can be well-formed only if the eventuality is a state. Since the sentence in (2) does not denote a state, the sentence is ruled out.

There are obvious empirical problems with this analysis, many of which Kamp & Reyle acknowledge. Specifically, they mention the futurate, or timetable, present, illustrated in (1c), the habitual or generic present, shown in (1b), the reportive present (1d), and the historical present, shown in (5):

- (5) Do you know what Jenny **did** to me the other day? Well, just as I **was** leaving for the office, she *comes* in and *tells* me I've won the lottery and I'm going to receive a million dollars. I nearly **passed** out from shock. And then she *tells* me it **was** a joke and I *haven't* won anything at all.

They explicitly exclude from consideration all four of these uses of the present tense, considering “only the ‘standard’ use of the present tense, in which all present tense sentences describe states” (1993:538).

Smith 1991

In her 1991 book entitled *The Parameter of Aspect*, Carlota Smith claims that English simple tenses have perfective viewpoint. Regarding the generic, or habitual, use of the present, she calls it a ‘derived stative,’ saying that “the combination of present tense and perfective viewpoint leads to a habitual reading in many languages. This is true for English non-statives” (1991:40). However, she does not explain how or why the habitual reading arises.

As for the timetable use of the present, she claims that a sentence like (1c) “presents an extended situation that includes two times: it holds at Speech Time and is associated with a future time” (1991:248). The meaning of the term “is associated with” is not made clear, and again, it is not shown exactly why this reading arises, and why, for example, there is no futurate use of the simple past. In other words, why are both sentences in (6) grammatical, while (7b) is ungrammatical?

- (6) a. Charlotte is teaching syntax next term.
- b. Charlotte teaches syntax next term.
- (7) a. Charlotte was teaching syntax next term. (but now it appears she's going to teach phonetics)
- b. *Charlotte taught syntax next term.

Sentences with the reportive use of the present, says Smith, "telescope time. We understand them punctually, as though the events take only an instant regardless of their normal duration" (1991:154). Such a view of reportives, however, contradicts her account of non-reportive punctual sentences.

Regarding the punctuals, Smith follows unpublished work by Kamp & Rohrer (1989), whom she cites as saying: "No event whose duration is properly included within that of the entire discourse may be reported in the present tense." Apparently, Kamp & Rohrer claim that this follows from the presupposition that verbal expression necessarily takes place after the thought it expresses has been conceived.

However, this view cannot be maintained along with Smith's account of reportives, in which verbal expression is claimed to take place in the same instant as the event it describes.

Other Views

Mürvet Enç, in her 1987 paper "Anchoring Conditions for Tense," does not discuss the problems of the simple present, but her account of tense is relevant to this paper in that it takes the speech time to be an interval rather than a moment, as most others do. The account to be proposed here will depend crucially on the speech time being taken as a moment. We will therefore have to show that we can account for the data Enç accounts for with an interval speech time.

Like Enç, Okamura (1996) does not discuss the simple present in detail, but says the following about the futurate use of the present:

"The simple present tense form describes an event the speaker feels to be unusually or absolutely certain of at the present moment of speaking. This being the case, the nature of the simple present is in such cases 'modal,' not temporal." He does not address any of the other readings of the simple present.

To sum up, then, discussions of the simple present in the literature are characterized either by a restricted view of the data, as in Kamp & Reyle (1993:773), or by a primarily descriptive approach, as in Smith (1991: 807). I will now turn to my proposal, which attempts to provide a unified, explanatory account of all of the uses of the simple present.

BACKGROUND AND ASSUMPTIONS

This section presents the relevant aspects of the general theory of tense within which the analysis is situated. A preliminary version of the theory is to be found in Cowper 1996a:764; 1996b:825.

English as a Default Perfective Language

I have suggested elsewhere (Cowper 1992) that languages can have one of two unmarked aspectual viewpoints. English takes perfective as the unmarked viewpoint, while French and Hungarian take imperfective as unmarked.¹ This difference is most clearly seen with accomplishments, which can readily receive either interpretation. The Hungarian simple tenses given in (8) are best rendered by English progressives, while the English simple tenses are best translated by Hungarian perfectives, as in (9). Note that the Hungarian version of (9a) has several different readings, similar to the various readings of the English translation.

- (8) a. *Judit olvassa a könyvet.*
Judith read.pres.def.3sg the book.acc
'Judith is reading the book.'

- b. *Judit olvasta a könyvet.*

Judith read.past.def.3sg the book.acc

'Judith was reading the book' or

'Judith read the book.' (but didn't necessarily finish it)

- (9) a. *Judit el olvassa a könyvet.*

Judith perf read.pres.def.3sg the book.acc

'Judith reads the book.'

- b. *Judit el olvasta a könyvet.*

Judith perf read.past.def.3sg the book.acc

'Judith read the book.' (and finished it)

Following Comrie (1976:17-18) I assume that the linguistic temporal representation of a perfective event is as a point in time. This is not to say that perfective events have no duration in real life, or that their duration cannot be overtly expressed in language. Rather, I claim that a tense system, that is the grammaticalized encoding of time in language, represents perfective events as points, without grammatically relevant duration.

The term 'perfective event' must also be clearly understood. The literature on tense and aspect is full of classifications of event-types, or Aktionsarten; that of Vendler (1957 [1967]) is perhaps the most frequently cited:

- (10) a. Achievement: a punctual event, as in

The light flashed.

The package arrived.

- b. Accomplishment: a process leading to a result, as in

Ruth drew a circle.

The company built six houses.

- c. Activity: a process that has no specific endpoint, as in

Ruth drew circles.

This company builds houses.

The refrigerator is running.

The ice is melting.

- d. State: a state of affairs that can persist with nothing happening:

The car is blue.

Martha resembles her father.

For our purposes, all event/state types can be described in terms of the temporal primitives POINT and INTERVAL.² These are, I claim, not only primitives in the mental representation of times, but also universal primitives of the tense system. Activities and states, by definition, have duration and are thus represented as intervals. Regardless of whether the default aspectual viewpoint of a language is perfective or imperfective, states and activities will be treated as intervals by the tense system. Achievements, also by definition, lack duration and are consistently treated as points by the tense system. Accomplishments have a dual nature, in that they are both telic and durative. They can thus be seen either as points or as intervals. Their interpretation in simple tenses thus depends entirely on whether the default aspect of the language is perfective or imperfective.

The term 'perfective event', as I use it here, denotes an accomplishment or achievement with a perfective viewpoint, that is an event treated by the tense system as a temporal point.

Properties of the Discourse Anchor

The second assumption is about the nature of the discourse anchor, often called the speech-time. Most work on tense takes the speech-time to be a temporal point, which serves to anchor the time reference of the sentence. Enç 1987, for reasons internal to her theory, is forced to claim that the speech-time is an arbitrarily large interval, possibly beginning well before the utterance. She uses this expansion of the speech-time to account for the dual-access reading of the present tense in sentences like (11):

- (11) Kate told me yesterday that Sue is sick.

For Enç, the speech-time is an interval including both the telling event and the time when (11) is uttered. The present-tense lower clause is interpreted as holding throughout this interval, giving the dual-access reading. Cowper 1996b proposes an alternative analysis which preserves the traditional view of the speech-time as a point, and I adopt that view here.

Monosemy

The third assumption has to do with the nature of a lexical representation. I assume the principle set forth in Cowper 1995:

(12) *The Principle of Strong Monosemy*

The conceptual structure of a lexical entry may contain no disjunctions and no optional elements. If the conceptual structures of two uses of a lexical item cannot be unified through underspecification, then they must be treated as distinct lexical entries.


This principle entails that we must come up with a single semantic representation for the English present tense morpheme. If this cannot be done, we will be forced to adopt the weaker and less interesting position that English has several completely homophonous present tenses.

Syntactic Structures

Following standard assumptions of early minimalist theory (Chomsky 1993, 1994), and consistent with recent minimalist work (Chomsky 1995), I assume that matrix clauses are projections of abstract tense morphemes, and are thus appropriately referred to as TP's. Properties of the TP as a whole are to a significant extent determined by the properties of the element heading the projection, that is, the tense morpheme itself. Just as the referential properties of nominal expressions (DP's) are determined by the element (D) heading the DP, the temporally referential properties of a TP are determined by the tense morpheme heading that TP. Specifically, I assume that a sentence like (13) has a Spellout representation as in (14):

(13) Chris took the car.

(14)



ES is simply a name for the bundle of features that constitute the English finite present tense morpheme. It is the purpose of this paper to investigate exactly what those features are.

A Referential Theory of Tense

Now let us look briefly at the general structure of the theory of tense being assumed here. I adopt a morphologically-grounded referential view of tense, with the meaning of each tense morpheme specified in terms of privative semantic features, or elements of meaning. By referential, I mean that tense phrases, like determiner phrases, are linked by coindexing to a referential domain. Determiner phrases are indexed to elements in Domain D – the well-known universe of discourse – whereas for tense phrases the referential domain consists of a single point in time. That point is frequently the moment of speech, but in narrative contexts can be some other

point. I shall refer to this point with the general term 'discourse anchor' (DA).

In both nominal and clausal domains, there are two kinds of coindexing relations that hold either between linguistic expressions or between a linguistic expression and the referential domain. One is unmarked, and encodes a relation of identity. The other is marked. With nominals, the marked relation is one of disjoint reference, while with tense the marked relation is one of precedence. Saxon 1984 discusses a Dogrib anaphor which bears the marked relation to its local antecedent. In tense systems, present tense morphemes generally bear the unmarked coindexing relation of identity, or simultaneity in temporal terms, while past tense morphemes bear the marked relation of precedence. Thus, both sentences in (15) are coindexed with the DA. The difference between the two sentences is that (15a) bears the unmarked relation of simultaneity, while (15b) bears the marked relation of precedence.

(15) a. Kevin lives in Winnipeg.

b. Kevin lived in Winnipeg.

Marked coindexing is a lexical property of particular referential elements – anaphors, pronominals and determiners in the case of the nominal system, and tense morphemes for the tense system.

Another lexical property of tense morphemes is whether they place their clauses in realis time or in irrealis time. Realis TP's, by definition, are coindexed, possibly indirectly, and possibly in a marked fashion, with the DA. Since the two coindexing relations are precedence and simultaneity, realis time is limited to the times preceding or simultaneous with the DA. Irrealis TP's, in contrast, are not coindexed with the DA. They are, however, anchored to the DA, but in a different way. An irrealis TP is linked to the DA via what I call a temporal nexus.

A nexus is a point in realis time where the realis time line, intuitively speaking, intersects with another, irrealis time line. The most obvious source of a nexus is a conditional clause, as in (16):

(16) If Bob had won the election, Newt would be happy.

The complementizer *if* determines a temporal nexus, and the contents of the *if*-clause specify properties of the possible world organized around the alternative time line.

Many other linguistic elements can determine a nexus. Some are lexical elements such as the verbs *hope*, *wish*, and *demand*, and modals like *will*, *can*, and *might*. There are others, some of which are abstract, like the imperative complementizer. The subjunctive tense morphemes also determine a temporal nexus. Since the nexus itself is in realis time, it must be coindexed with the discourse anchor, and therefore is either simultaneous or prior to the DA.

There is an important distinction to be made between two types of temporal relation. The first relation is that holding between a realis TP and the DA, and the second is the relation holding between two TP's. Consider the discourse in (17):

(17) a. What happened when you lived in Toronto?

b. Let's see. There *was* a general strike, we *had* the coldest summer in 50 years, Prince Philip *visited* and *opened* the Royal Winter Fair, Conrad Black *bought* some more newspapers, Consumers' Distributing *went* bankrupt ... it *was* an interesting year.

All of the italicized verbs in (16b) are in the past tense, and their TP's are therefore all coindexed, in the marked fashion, with the DA. They therefore all take place prior to the moment of speech. But what of the temporal relations among these TP's? These are left entirely unspecified, and their temporal order is therefore entirely free. Extralinguistic information is generally used by the listener to establish an order of events, where the order matters.

It is therefore possible for several TP's, each of which is coindexed with the DA, to be temporally unordered with respect to each other. It is, however, not possible for a realis TP to be unordered with respect to the

DA. If a TP is coindexed with the DA, then either the coindexing is unmarked and the TP is simultaneous with the DA, or the coindexing is marked and the TP precedes the DA.

THE ANALYSIS

Let us now turn to the specific construction under consideration: the simple present. First, let's consider a straightforward example, like the sentence in (18):

(18) Diane lives in Toronto.

What makes (18) easy is the fact that it is stative. In other words, the TP headed by the present tense morpheme denotes an interval. Let us assume that the present tense morpheme essentially means that the TP it heads is simultaneous (that is, coindexed in an unmarked fashion) with the discourse anchor. Since the moment of speech is a point and the TP is an interval, the result is that the interval denoted by the TP includes the moment of speech.

A Proposal

What happens when the TP denotes, not an interval but a point? One might think that such a case should be even simpler than the one just discussed. If the present tense morpheme makes its TP simultaneous with the moment of speech, and both are points, there should be no problem coindexing them. However, I claim that such a scenario violates a universal constraint on tense systems, proposed in (19):

- (19) *The Principle of Non-Simultaneity of Points*
No tense morpheme or other functional element in any language can impose simultaneity on two temporal points.

Effectively, I am claiming that the semantic granularity of grammatical elements is too coarse to express simultaneity between points. In order to express such simultaneity, speakers must resort to the richer semantic structures of the lexical elements of the language, using phrases like *at precisely the same instant*, and so on.

Before applying this principle to the simple present, I will give you some independent evidence in its favour. Consider the sentences in (20):

- (20) a. The lion was roaring and the bird flew away.
b. The lion roared and the bird flew away.

The only difference in the form of these sentences is that in (a), the first conjunct is in the past progressive, while in (b) the first conjunct is in the simple past. Thus in (a) the first conjunct denotes an interval, and the second conjunct a point. The interpretation normally assigned to this sentence is that the bird flew away while the lion was roaring. The two conjuncts are thus interpreted as simultaneous. In (b), both conjuncts denote temporal points, and the two conjuncts are interpreted as taking place, not simultaneously, but one after the other. The functional element *and*, while it can establish simultaneity between a point and an interval, cannot on its own establish simultaneity between two points. Note that simultaneity between two points can be expressed with the aid of adverbial modification, as in (21):

- (21) a. At exactly the same time, the lion roared and the bird flew away.
b. When the alarm went off, the lion roared and the bird flew away.

The constraint is thus shown to hold, not of semantic representations in general but of the relations established by grammatical elements.

Other functional elements behave in the same way, as can be seen in (22) and (23):

- (22) a. Sue left the room *when* the baby was coughing.
 b. Sue left the room *when* the baby coughed.
- (23) a. The student was objecting, *but* the dean signed the document.
 b. The student objected, *but* the dean signed the document.

A second piece of evidence for the principle of non-simultaneity of points can be seen in the interpretation of past-tense verbs embedded in past-tense intensional contexts. Consider the sentences in (24) and (25):

- (24) a. The teacher said that Henry loved his wife.
 b. The teacher said that Henry VIII loved his wife.
- (25) The teacher said that Henry divorced his wife.

The main clause in all three sentences denotes a point. The embedded clause in both sentences in (24) denotes an interval, while the embedded clause in (25) denotes a point. There are two possible interpretations for the sentences in (24). In one, the embedded clause is interpreted as simultaneous with the main clause (more salient in (24a)), while in the other, the embedded clause is interpreted as taking place before the time of the main clause (more salient in (24b)). The details of exactly how these interpretations are available are discussed in Cowper 1996b. What is relevant for the present paper is that a past tense embedded clause can generally be interpreted as simultaneous to a past tense main clause. As shown in (25), however, this possibility disappears when both clauses denote temporal points.

I leave aside the details of why the embedded clause in (25) must be interpreted as earlier, rather than later than the main clause. The relevance of this example is simply that when both clauses denote points, they are interpreted as taking place sequentially. This follows from the principle of non-simultaneity of points.

How the Analysis Works

Let us now see how this principle can help us understand the English simple present tense with achievements and accomplishments. Let's take (1b), repeated here as (26), to start with.

- (26) Ruthie walks to school.

The verb phrase here is an accomplishment, with an endpoint (arrival at school) and a duration. Since English has a default perfective viewpoint, the tense system represents the TP in (26) as a point. The discourse anchor, or moment of speech, is also a point. The principle of non-simultaneity of points makes it impossible for these two points to be placed in a relation of simultaneity by the present tense morpheme. This means that (26) cannot be interpreted as a punctual event taking place at the same time as the moment of speech.

We have now accounted for the absence of the apparently simplest reading of (26). It remains to account for the various readings that do occur. What I will now show is that every possible interpretation of the elements in (26) that respects non-simultaneity of points, as well as the other constraints of the theory, is an attested interpretation of the sentence.

The ill-formed situation of two simultaneous points is depicted in (27):

- (27) • (Discourse Anchor)
 | (is simultaneous with)
 • (Punctual Event)

There are three component parts to the situation: the discourse anchor, the punctual event, and the relation of simultaneity. There are thus three logically possible ways of minimally altering the scenario so as not to violate the principle of non-simultaneity of points. These are (a) to interpret the event as denoting an interval, (b) to interpret the discourse anchor as an interval and (c) to eliminate the relation of simultaneity. Let us consider each of these possibilities in turn.

Interpreting a perfective event as denoting an interval:

If the TP in (26) denoted an interval, not a point, then the principle of non-simultaneity of points would not be violated, and the interpretation would be well-formed. However, we are not free, in English, to assign an imperfective reading to a perfective event, in the absence of an overt grammatical element forcing such an interpretation. Such an interpretation would entail using the marked aspectual viewpoint for English. The marked viewpoint, I claim, is only available if it is forced by overt grammatical elements in the sentence. In English, the present participial element *-ing* signals the marked aspectual viewpoint. The only way for a perfective event to denote an interval is for it to denote, not an event at all but rather a state or property. If *walks to school* in (26) is taken to be a property of Ruth, then the sentence denotes, not a particular event of walking to school but rather a state that holds over a potentially unbounded interval. This gives us the generic or habitual reading of the simple present.

Interpreting the discourse anchor as an interval:

If the discourse anchor could be taken as an interval, then the punctual event could be interpreted as taking place during that interval, achieving simultaneity without violating non-simultaneity of points. What would it mean for the DA to be taken as an interval rather than as a point? As Jackendoff 1987 points out, any bounded event can be viewed, either from a distance as punctual or from close up as taking place over an interval. If the DA is normally taken as a point, then in order for it to be interpreted as an interval the speaker, and presumably the hearer as well, must be taking a very close view of the speech event. Effectively, the speaker is inviting the hearer to experience the speech event, and the events described by the utterance, with the same immediacy that the speaker experiences. This vividness is what characterizes the reportive use of the present tense, with the events described taking place even as they are being reported.

Eliminating the relation of simultaneity:

There are two ways in which the relation of simultaneity might be eliminated from the scenario in (27). One is for the event to remain coindexed with the discourse anchor, but for the coindexing to be interpreted in a marked fashion. This would situate the event prior to the moment of speech. The second possibility is for the event not to be coindexed with the DA at all, but to be linked through a temporal nexus. This would situate the event in irrealis time, one instantiation of which is the future. The first of these possibilities is not available, as shown by the ungrammaticality of (28):

(28) *Ruth walks to school when she was a little girl.

Why is this reading unavailable? I claim that marked forms of coindexing are triggered only by the elements lexically specified for marked coindexing. Thus disjoint anaphora arises in Dogrib only in the presence of the disjoint anaphor, and precedence coindexing in English arises only in the presence of a past tense morpheme. Since there is no past tense morpheme in (28), marked coindexing is unavailable.

The only option, then, is to eliminate the coindexing altogether. This can only be done if there is, in the discourse, an element determining a temporal nexus, such as a future adverbial, a modal, an imperative complementizer, or a verb of wishing. The only such element that can appear governing a matrix TP in the simple present tense is an adverbial, as illustrated in (29):

(29) Ruth walks to school tomorrow.

The adverb *tomorrow* determines a temporal nexus, generating an irrealis time line linked to the discourse anchor. The specific meaning of the adverb identifies an interval on this irrealis time line. The event is interpreted as occurring in irrealis time, that is, during the irrealis interval denoted by the adverb. This is the timetable reading of the simple present.

Note that this analysis correctly predicts that the timetable reading is only available when a temporal nexus is present. Sentence (26), on its own, does not have the timetable reading.

The Historical Present

We have now seen that the three odd readings of the English simple present tense follow directly from a single constraint on grammatical meaning. There remains one use of the simple present: the historical present, shown in (5) and repeated here as (30):

- (30) Do you know what Jenny **did** to me the other day? Well, just as I **was** leaving for the office, she *comes* in and *tells* me I've won the lottery and I'm going to receive a million dollars. I nearly **passed** out from shock. And then she *tells* me it **was** a joke and I *haven't* won anything at all.

The first thing to notice about (30) is that the discourse shifts back and forth between present and past tense several times. Any account of the historical present will have to allow for this switching.

The second interesting thing about the historical present is that it has many of the properties of the ordinary present. Both the habitual/generic reading and the reportive reading are available. An example of the habitual/generic reading is given in (31):

- (31) During my last year of teaching before I retired a strange thing happened. One of my students walks into the office and asks to speak to me. I always *get* to work early, so I do have time to talk to her. She tells me she wants to hand her paper in a week before the due date.

This can be accounted for if we assume that the historical present involves, not an unusual relation between the sentence and the unmarked discourse anchor (that is, the moment of speech) but rather the usual relation between the sentence and a marked discourse anchor. In other

words, I claim that with the historical present the discourse anchor is distinct from, and earlier than, the moment of speech. All the same constraints hold here as when the DA is the moment of speech, giving the same possible interpretations of the simple present, with two understandable differences. First, the greater preponderance of the reportive use in the historical present is, I think, due to the discourse conditions governing the establishment of a marked discourse anchor. A marked discourse anchor serves to make the past time more immediate by inviting the hearer to adopt the perspective of that earlier time. In doing this, a marked discourse anchor serves a purpose similar to that of the expansion of the discourse anchor from a point to an interval. In fact, that expansion could be seen as simply one variety of marked discourse anchor. Both the expansion of the DA to an interval, and the establishment of a DA distinct from the moment of speech, contribute to the vividness of the discourse, and it is not surprising that they are used together.

What about the alternations between past and present tense seen in (30)? Is the discourse anchor constantly shifting back and forth between some prior time and the moment of speech? This would suggest that the discourse should have a disjointed flavour, and might lead us to look for discourses in which the discourse anchor shifts constantly from one point to another, not necessarily back and forth between the same two points. Such discourses do indeed seem very disjointed, and very different from the discourse in (30). What is going on in (30), I claim, is that there are two discourse anchors active at the same time. Specifically, when a marked discourse anchor has been established, the moment of speech is still available to anchor sentences in the discourse. The effect, as seen in (30), is of a dual perspective on the events being described.

There is one use of the simple present that is not available in the historical present: the timetable use. Recall that the timetable use resulted from the presence in the sentence of an element determining a temporal nexus, which shifted the TP into irrealis time. With the historical present, there are two discourse anchors, both of which are in realis time: the

NOTES

¹ This is in the spirit of work by Smith 1991, although her approach is more descriptive. Also, she allows three viewpoints: perfective, imperfective and neutral, while I allow only perfective and imperfective. See also DeCaen 1996.

² Kamp & Reyle discuss the question of which of these elements is theoretically prior and which might be derived from the other. I leave this question aside.

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